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Spatial dependence in museum services: 
An analysis of the Italian case 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper aims to study whether the choice of a museum concerning the service provision is 
influenced by the choices of its neighbors; we also aim to understand which mechanisms 
underpin the neighborhood effects. The services under our investigation concern activities 
aimed to enlarge the accessibility (e.g., evening openings, upon-request openings, etc.), 
supporting activities to improve the collection fruition (e.g., the availability of brochures, the 
presence of audio-guides, the presence of guided tours, the provision of childcare activities, 
and so on), and the presence of web-services. We investigate whether the availability of such 
services in a museum is influenced by the availability of similar services in neighboring 
museums. 
As it happens in the supply of other public services, like education and healthcare (e.g., 
Matlock et al., 2014; Guccio and Lisi, 2016; Longo et al., 2017), the reasons to expect that 
such a spatial influence in services’ provision does exist can be related to a number of factors:  
competition pressure,  imitation mechanisms among the managers (peer effect), institutional 
rules leading museums to make similar choices. 
In fact, museums are institutions that offer different services. In economic terms, 
museums can be assimilated to multi-product or multi-services firms whose production 
function includes collection, conservation, research and exhibition of statements of tangible 
and intangible cultural heritage (Fernandez-Blanco and Prieto-Rodriguez, 2011). 
The weight of the different functions of museums and the way in which the museum 
functions are perceived have been changing over time. Museums are no longer cultural 
institutions mainly devoted to the conservation of arts items; museums are called to provide 
both local residents and foreign visitors with education and entertainment contents 
(Desvallées and Mairesse, 2010); education and entertainment activities are requested to be 
joint with live experiences from exhibition fruition, to lead visitors into what is labeled as 
‘edutainment’ (the active combination of education and entertainment). Moreover, the more 
and more stringent budget constraints suffered by museums over recent years in several 
countries, have driven the museum managers to see the complementary supplied services as 
2 
 
potential alternative sources of revenues, sometimes necessary to support the traditional 
“core-business” of museums, namely conservation, research and exhibitions. 
Thus, it is reasonable to expect that competition among museums to attract visitors is 
played not only on the basis of the content of collections, but also on the services supplied in 
order to facilitate access and collection fruition. In this framework, it is interesting to evaluate 
whether the supply of services in a museum is affected by the neighbors’ choices. 
We take Italy as the case-study. Italy is rich of museums: nearly 5 thousand sites, 
including museums, monuments, archeological areas can be listed; most of them are small in 
terms of visits while others can be considered as world-level superstars. In Italy, private 
museums coexist with governmental museums, and –within the group of governmental 
museums– different institutes are endowed with different degrees of autonomy. Like in other 
service sectors where the presence of public providers is common (let us think of the 
healthcare sector or the childcare or the education sector), a larger degree of autonomy has 
been thought as a tool to enhance competition among providers, and hence to promote the 
service quality. In the present investigation, concerning the museum sector, “quality” means 
visitors’ satisfaction through additional services, such as the possibility of avoiding queue, 
thanks to online reservation and ticket office, or the availability of children-oriented services, 
or tools to improve the comprehension and to enjoy the experience during the visit also thanks 
to innovative devices. 
From the technical point of view, in order to evaluate whether neighborhood effects do 
operate in the case of museum service provision, we employ the SAR (Spatial Auto-
Regressive) model. We consider a very large cross-section sample of museums, as observed 
in 2015, and we investigate whether a significant influence of the neighbors emerges, as far as 
the number and type of offered services are concerned. Needless to say, the number and 
nature of available services are investigated conditional on the type of museum, and other 
individual, institutional and environmental characteristics. 
We document that neighborhood effects in general do emerge. However, their strength 
is not homogeneous across museum types. The auto-Poisson model and the auto-binomial 
model –that could be alternative and appropriate regression models, in front of the dependent 
count-variable– fully confirm the evidence from the simpler SAR specification. We will 
discuss whether the evidence can be solely due to sound competition among museums, or 
other reasons may be consistent with the emerging evidence. 
Section 2 recalls some feature of museums and their services, just to make clear that our 
present investigation focuses on a specific set of museum services, which are a part of what 
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museums do offer. Section 3 presents the data at hand and discusses the empirical 
specification of the model. Section 4 provides the results of the econometric investigations. 
Comments and conclusions are gathered in Section 5. 
    
 
2. Institutional feature of museums and the case of Italy 
 
The most widely recognized definition, reported in the Statutes of ICOM - the International 
Council of Museums, affirms that museum is a “permanent institution in the service of society 
and its development, open to the public, which acquires, conserves, researches, communicates 
and exhibits the tangible and intangible heritage of humanity and its environment for the 
purposes of education, study and enjoyment”; museums aim to increase human knowledge 
and preserve cultural heritage for present and future generations (ICOM, 2007). 
The demand for goods and services provided by museums is both private and social 
(Frey and Meier, 2006). The private demand comes from individuals interested in visiting the 
collections for entertainment, enjoyment or cultural curiosity, or for research proposals in the 
case of professional people. The social demand comes from local communities and the whole 
society, as museums can contribute to preserve and to define the cultural identity of a 
community and the humankind history, but also to promote the regeneration of depressed 
urban areas, and to enhance the tourism attractiveness of an area. 
As far as the nature of the ‘museum’ institution and its services concern, some 
distinctions are necessary. On the one hand, museum collections can be public or chargeable 
goods: apart from congestion, there is not rivalry in the consumption. Moreover, the 
possibility of whether or not to exclude someone from the consumption is a decision 
concerning the entrance fee policy: both charged and free entrance (or a combination of them) 
is possible from a technical and economic point of view, and the marginal cost of a visitor is 
negligible. On the other hand, museum services to support the visit are private goods that each 
visitor can decide ideally whether or not to buy: they are rival and excludable and therefore 
they usually have a price. Interestingly, museum buildings –that are sometimes designed by 
famous architects or “archi-stars” and could become more attractive than the collection 
exhibited inside– can be interpreted as being pure public goods: there is not rivalry in the 
consumption and no one can be excluded from consumption; museum buildings often produce 
positive externalities to the area where are located and benefit local communities. 
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These differences concerning museum characteristics and services have institutional 
relevance. The ownership of museum buildings and collections can be public or private; 
generally, they are (or have to be, according to the definition provided by ICOM) non-profit 
oriented institutions; governmental ownership and management prevail in the Latin European 
countries, while private non-profit institutions benefitting from private tax-exempted 
donations prevail in the Anglo-Saxon countries.1 In both the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, private subjects (individuals or companies) are usually involved as donors or 
financiers for the maintenance of museum buildings and collections; a more direct 
involvement of private companies occurs for the supply of complementary services to support 
the visit: such complementary services can be outsourced to external private (profit-oriented) 
companies, also by part of governmental museums. 
In Italy, the possibility for governmental museums to resort to outsourcing services has 
been introduced in the mid-1990s (the so-called Ronchey Law in 1993), along with the 
adoption of a series of administrative and legislative acts permitting the involvement of the 
private sector in the supply of museum services; subsequent major reforms, in 2009 and in 
2014, have provided State museums with a larger degree of managerial and technical-
scientific autonomy. The mentioned reforms have aimed to simplify administration and to 
attribute museum directors the management of both the conservation and the valorization of 
their collections. However, the reform process has gone on (and it is still going on) quite 
slowly and only a small sub-group of governmental museums (superstars museums, 
monuments and archaeological sites like Galleria degli Uffizi, Caserta Real Palace, and 
Pompei, respectively) have a large degree of autonomy. The management of the other 
governmental museums still depends on the public sector administrations. In general, consider 
that governmental museums in Italy are still largely driven by a legislative-bureaucratic 
approach, though the recent reforms aimed to enhance the autonomy and the managerial 
perspective of museum directors (Zan et al., 2018). 
The picture of the universe of the museum institutions in Italy (as referred to 2015) is 
provided by Table 1. Museums are considered along similar cultural institutions, that is, 
archeological and historical parks and specific monuments and buildings. Data are provided 
by ISTAT, the Italian National Statistics Institute, and they are freely downloadable from the 
web (ISTAT, 2015).  
                                                                        
1 In Italy, the norms concerning arts-bonus (Decree 22/12/ 1986 updated by Law 4/11/2017) provide tax 
incentives for donations to governmental cultural institutions rather than to private no-profit cultural 
institutions. 
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Table 1 - Museums, monuments and archeological areas in Italy 
(a) 
Istitutional Feature Obs Percentage 
Total 4,976 100 
   
Gallery or museum  4,158 83.6 
Archeological area/park  282 5.7 
Monuments / Buildings 536 10.8 
   
Private ownership 1,820 36.6 
Public sector ownership 3,156 63.4 
State  439 8.8 
Public sector – Autonomous institute  546 11.0 
Public sector- Outsourced  993 20.0 
   
Part of a network 2,581 43.4 
(b) 
Type of collection Obs Percentage on total 
Percentage 
on museums 
Museums and Galleries 
Arts Museums 1,081 21.7 26.0 
Arts (unitl 1800s)   660 13.3 15.9 
Contemporary Arts (since 1900s) 421 8.5 10.1 
Ethnographic museums  694 13.9 16.7 
Archeology museums 611 12.3 14.7 
History museums  476 9.6 11.4 
Natural sciences and natural history museums  347 7.0 8.3 
Religious museums 201 4.0 4.8 
Science and technology museums 143 2.9 3.4 
Industry / Enterprise museums 118 2.4 2.8 
Thematic museums 426 8.6 10.2 
Other 61 1.2 1.5 
Monuments 
Churches and religious buildings 193 3.88  
Civil buildings and monuments  325 6.54  
(c) 
Geographical location All Only museums 
(with the percentage  of: 
 resident population; surface size) Obs % Obs % 
Total:  4,976  4,158  
North-West (25.9%; 19.2%) 1,137 22.8 993 23.9 
North-East (19.2%; 20.6%) 1,166 23.4 1,042 25.1 
Centre (19.9%;19.2%) 1,418 34.1 1,171 28.2 
South (35.0%; 41.0%) 750 15.1 611 14.7 
Note: Authors' elaboration on data from ISTAT (2015). 
 
 
About 5,000 museums and similar institutions are operative in Italy. The ownership of 
these cultural institutions is mostly governmental (63.4%) – at the level of State, Regions, 
local public administrations (provinces and municipalities), public school and universities.2 
The main part is represented by gallery or museum (84%) and, particularly, within museums, 
arts museums (26%), ethnographic museums (16.7%) and archeology museums (14.7%) – see 
Panels (a) and (b) of Table 1. Panel (c) provides information about the geographical 
                                                                        
2 Several public subjects are involved in governmental museum management; they include: the State 
through the Ministry of Cultural Goods and Activities with its peripheral offices (Sovrintendenze), Regions, 
Provinces, Municipalities, and also other subjects of the public sector in a broad sense, like public school, 
public universities, and firms under governmental or municipal control. 
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distribution of museums; museums are present in all regions, but the density (as related to 
resident population or surface size) is higher in Northern-Central regions and lower in 
Southern regions. 
In this very articulated and fragmented institutional framework, competition in the 
museum sector may assume different meanings. Competition can be among policy-makers 
that consider the museums’ endowment and the establishment of new museums as tourism 
attractors; valorization and accessibility policies to larger audiences should be main goals for 
policy-makers. Competition can be also among (private and governmental) museum directors, 
concerning their ability in attracting visitors, but also concerning their scientific reputation 
among peers, based on activities concerning conservation, research projects, academic 
publications and exhibitions for niche audiences. Finally, competition can be among private 
enterprises to gain the grant for supplying the museum supporting services. 
Clearly, the role played by museum services could be different according to the type of 
museum, the type of art collection and the consequent different degree of interactive fruition 
(let us think of fine arts museums versus science and technology museums). 
The idea of the present investigation is to assess whether neighborhood effects do 
operate in the provision of museum services, and then to evaluate whether such effects can be 
related to the different levels of competition among museums. To this end, we take into 
account information concerning the specific services offered by the museums, as reported by 
the most recent ISTAT research. 
 
 
3. Data and empirical research strategy 
 
3.1 Data description 
 
The main source of data in our empirical analysis is the museum census (Indagine sui musei e 
le istituzioni similari) provided by the Italian National Statistics Institute (ISTAT, 2015). This 
census covers all Italian cultural heritage institutions (i.e. museums and galleries, 
archeological sites, monuments and other similar institutions) and collects information on the 
type of services and activities provided by them. The most recent census refers to 4,976 
cultural institutions in 2015. After having cleaned for missing values, the final sample for the 
present analysis consists of 2,165 museums, monuments and other similar cultural 
institutions, for which we can recover full information on the variables of interest. 
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The dependent variable in our analysis is the total number of services (N_TOT_SERV) 
provided by museums and other similar institutions. As already mentioned, the census 
includes information on services related to the museum accessibility (N_SERV_ACCESS), 
services supporting visitors’ experience (N_SUPPORT_SERV), and the presence of web 
services (N_WEB_SERV) which increase museum visibility. Overall, a total of 37 services 
have been selected from the survey, 5 related to the museum accessibility, 23 to supporting 
services, and 9 to web services. Table 2 reports the detailed list of the services included in our 
analysis. Admittedly, in our present study on official data, we can simply observe the 
presence of these services, aimed to support accessibility and to enrich the visit experience; 
nothing can be said on how they really work, and their effectiveness in increasing the visitor 
enjoyment. 
 
Table 2 - Museum services 
ACCESSIBILITY 14. Presence of info material for disabled 
1. Predefined opening hours  15. Presence of tickets and visits reservation 
2. Opening upon request 16. Presence of parking space 
3. Evening openings 17. Presence of cloakroom  
4. Full year opening 18. Presence of cafeteria and restaurant  
5. Open house days 19. Presence of bookshop 
SUPPORTING SERVICES 20. Presence of guided visits  
1. Presence of museum service charter 21. Presence of childcare services 
2. Presence of map at entrance with visiting paths 22. Presence of assistance services for disabled  
3. Presence of info point 23. Presence of free Wi-Fi 
4. Presence of info poster at entrance WEB SERVICES 
5. Presence of signs highlighting visiting paths 1. Presence of website 
6. Presence of brochures  2. Presence of online catalogue for visitors 
7. Presence of captions describing single displays  3. Presence of online ticket purchase  
8. Presence of audio guides 4. Presence of online virtual visit  
9. Presence of video guides 5. Presence of account in social media 
10. Presence of proximity systems 6. Presence of online bookshop 
11. Presence of multimedia devises  7. Presence of online merchandising  
12. Presence of AV room  8. Presence of newsletter 
13. Presence of info material for children 9. Presence of online community 
 
 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics concerning the dependent variable(s), along with 
the other control variables included in our empirical analysis. The comparison between Table 
1 and 3 documents that our sample replies the composition of the Italian museums' universe 
very closely: observations deleted due to missing information do not bias the sample. On 
average, the museums in our sample offer 14 services, corresponding about to the 38% of the 
number of considered services. However, descriptive statistics show a large variability across 
museums. A similarly heterogeneous picture emerges for the three categories of services. 
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Table 3 - Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total number of services (N_TOT_SERV) 14.40 6.33 1 35 
Number of services relating to accessibility (N_SERV_ACCESS) 3.06 1.14 0 5 
Services supporting visitor experience (SN_SUPPORT_SERV) 9.17 4.30 0 22 
Number of web services (N_WEB_SERV) 2.17 1.92 0 9 
Governmental museums (GOVERN) 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Autonomous governmental museums (AUTON) 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Outsourced governmental museums (OUTS) 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Private museums (PRIV) 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Gallery or museum (MUS)  0.84 0.37 0 1 
Part of a network (NET) 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Opened before 1946 (BEF1946) 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Educational activity (EDU) 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Presence of director (DIR) 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Presence of scientific curator (CUR) 0.45 0.49 0 1 
“Friends of the museum” club (FRIENDS) 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Part of inter-institutional agreement (INTERINST) 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Exhibition surface (SURF) 3969.27 24050.69 2 500000 
Number of employees (EMP) 10.78 20.86 0 411 
Number of employees per unit of surface (EMPRATIO) 2.73 5.04 0 66.67 
Number of museums in the province (NMUSPROV) 69.91 44.80 9 204 
Number of beds in accommodations in the province (BEDS)  65855.13 68001.32 2324 366341 
Population in the province (POP) 835605.1 970836.1 57480 4341260 
Note: The table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the following empirical analysis. The 
sample is made of 2,165 observations. 
       
The first group of regressors in our estimates concerns the ownership type and the 
organizational structure of museums (e.g., Bertacchini et al., 2018). Governmental museums 
(GOVERN) are museums owned and managed by the State or by other public (regional and 
local) public administrations, while private museums (PRIV) are owned by the private sector. 
Among the governmental museums, autonomous museums (AUTON) have their own budget 
and, thus, a certain degree of independence from the government; instead, outsourced 
museums (OUTS) are still owned by governments but their management is contracted out to 
an external contractor. In our dataset, 12% and 21% are autonomous museums and outsourced 
museums, respectively. 
In our regression analysis, we also control for several characteristics of the museums 
and other similar institutes under scrutiny: MUS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject 
is a “gallery or museum”, which represent the 84% of our sample (the remaining observations 
are monuments, buildings or archeological sites and parks); NET is a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the institute is part of a network (49%), while BEF1946 is equal to 1 if it has opened 
before 1946 (12%). DIR and CUR are dummy variables equal to 1 if the institute has a 
specific director (59%) and a scientific curator (45%), respectively. FRIENDS and 
INTERINST are dummy variables equal to 1 if the museum (or the institute, more in general) 
has an “Association of Friends” (30%) and if it is part of an inter-institutional agreement with 
other public institutions in the local area (49%), respectively. EDU is a dummy variable equal 
9 
 
to 1 if the institute organizes also educational activities (61%). Again, among the structural 
characteristics which we control for, SURF is the (log of) exhibition surface of the museum, 
which controls (at least in part) for the extent of the museum collection; EMP is the number 
of employees in the museum, which controls for the museum dimension (we also consider the 
number of employees per unit of surface, EMPRATIO, to control for potential nonlinearities 
in the production function of museums). 
Moreover, we control for some characteristics of the environment where the museum is 
located. NMUSPROV is the total number of museums (also those not included in the final 
sample) in the same province, which controls for the extent of the potential competitive 
pressure in the local area. On average –though with a very large variability– there are about 
70 cultural institutions in each Italian province. Then, we include the (log of) number of beds 
in accommodation (BEDS) and the (log of) population (POP) in the province; both variables 
are provided by ISTAT, and they are included to control for the potential demand (from both 
residents and tourists).3 
 
3.2 Empirical research strategy 
 
Our empirical strategy aims to evaluate the presence of spatial dependence in the number of 
services provided by museums. Our baseline regression model is the Spatial Auto-Regressive 
(SAR) model (e.g., Anselin, 1988): 
                                                                    (1) 
where  is the number of services (N_TOT_SERV) provided by museum i,  is a vector of 
the abovementioned control variables at the museum level,  is a vector of the control 
variables at the province level, and  is a normally distributed error term .  
is the term capturing the spatial lag of the number of services provided by museums, and it is 
shaped by the neighborhood effect implicitly assumed by the spatial weights matrix . The 
element  of the spatial matrix  indicates the potential interaction effect between unit i 
and j, and the strength of the spatial effect is given by the unknown spatial parameter  that 
                                                                        
3 The effect of tourism flows on museum attendance (and/or vice-versa) is the object of a very large body 
of theoretical and empirical research: see, e.g. Cellini and Cuccia (2013, 2019), Carey et al. (2012), 
Borowiecki and Castiglione (2014). 
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needs to be estimated. The estimation of parameters of model (1), namely, , , , , , can 
be carried out by maximum likelihood (e.g., Le Sage and Pace, 2009). 
In our empirical application, the row-standardized spatial weights matrix  in model 
(1) is as follows: 
                                                                                               (2)  
where  is the region where museum i is located and  indicates the total number of 
museums (in our final sample) located in region . According to (2), the spatial lag is the 
average number of services provided by the other (with respect to i) museums in the same 
region. Then, we also consider the same spatial weights matrix at the province level: 
                                                                                             (3) 
where  is the province where museum i is located and  is the total number of museums (in 
our final sample) located in province p. Therefore, the spatial lag in (3) is the average number 
of services provided by the other museums in the same province. 
A potential limitation of model (1) is that our dependent variable yi is a count variable 
(as it provides the number of services offered by museums), while the standard SAR model is 
more appropriate when dealing with continuous variables. Indeed, previous literature has 
shown that a count random variable can be well approximated by a normal random variable 
when the expected count is sufficiently large (such as, greater than 10), as the frequency 
distribution resembles a normal frequency distribution (e.g., Griffith, 2006). As can be seen in 
Table 3, the mean number of services in our sample is 14; therefore, the specification of the 
SAR model could be appropriate in our empirical application. 
Nonetheless, to test the robustness of our results, we also estimate the auto-Poisson 
model (e.g., Besag, 1974), where the spatially lagged dependent variable is included in the 
intensity equation and the dependent variable conditional on its neighbors  follows a 
Poisson distribution, that is  with 
E(yi)=                                                           (4) 
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The auto-Poisson model appears to be the most intuitive way to introduce the SAR-like 
spatial structure in count-data modeling, and it has been used in a few applications dealing 
with count random variables (e.g., Mears and Bhati, 2006; Andersson et al., 2009). However, 
the auto-Poisson model suffers from the limitation that, with positive spatial autocorrelation 
(i.e., ), the spatially lagged dependent variable into the exponential function might cause 
the process to be explosive (e.g., Besag, 1974; Cressie, 1993). As a result, it is usually stated 
that the auto-Poisson model can accommodate only negative spatial autocorrelation, which 
makes it of limited use (e.g., Besag, 1974; Cressie, 1993). 
To overcome the limitation of the auto-Poisson model, a suggested route is to estimate 
the following auto-binomial model (e.g., Besag, 1974; Griffith, 2006): 
                                                           (5) 
where N is the upper limit of the count random variable, in our case 37 museum services. The 
auto-binomial specification for count-data exploits the fact that a Poisson random variable can 
be approximated by a binomial random variable, and entails the important advantage that it 
can fully accommodate positive spatial autocorrelation (e.g., Kaiser and Cressie, 1997; 
Griffith, 2006). The parameters of the auto-binomial model (5) can be consistently estimated 
by pseudo-likelihood estimation of the binomial model which includes the count 
autoregressive component  as a covariate (e.g., Besag, 1974; Griffith, 2006). 
Therefore, to test further the robustness of our results, in the following we provide 
estimates for the three empirical specifications (i.e., SAR, auto-Poisson, auto-binomial) using 
both spatial weights matrixes (2) and (3). It is worth noticing that the (marginal effect 
associated to the) spatial parameter ρ  of the auto-binomial specification captures the 
dependence of the proportion of counts (over the upper limit) upon the neighbors’ counts, and 
has to be interpreted accordingly when compared to the estimates of the SAR and auto-
Poisson model. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
As a preliminary evidence of spatial dependence in the number of services provided by 
museums, we present the Moran’s I statistic to evaluate departures from spatial randomness. 
Table 4 shows significant positive spatial correlation in N_TOT_SERV, irrespective of 
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considering the regional or provincial spatial weight matrixes. This means that significant 
spatial dependence in data is present, both if the regional level is considered, and in the case 
of the provincial level. 
 
 
Table 4 - Moran's I Tests 
Variables Moran’s I Statistics p-value 
N_TOT_SERVREG 0.058 0.000*** 
N_TOT_SERVPROV 0.079 0.000*** 
 
 
Table 5 reports the results from the SAR model; columns 1 to 3 (4 to 6) refer to spatial 
weights matrix at the regional (provincial) level. In the first specification (i.e., column 1 and 
4) we include only the ownership and the organizational variables as covariates. In the second 
specification (i.e., column 2 and 5) we also consider other regressors at the museum level as 
covariates. Finally, the third specification (i.e., column 3 and 6) includes control variables at 
the province level. We find a positive and significant spatial dependence in the number of 
services provided by museums (SPATIAL LAGGED Y), even after controlling for our full set 
of covariates. The positive spatial dependence comes out with both spatial weights matrixes, 
though it is always higher when using spatial matrix at the regional level. More specifically, 
estimates in Table 5 suggest that a marginal increase in the average number of services 
provided by museums in a region is, ceteris paribus, associated with a significant increase of 
about 0.2-0.6 (according to specification) in the expected number of services offered by a 
single museum located in that region. 
As for the ownership type, private museums (PRIV) provide more services than 
governmental ones. The organizational structure of museums also matters, as autonomous 
(AUTON) and outsourced museums (OUTS) provide more services as well. Overall, the 
results for the ownership type and organizational mode are fully in line with those reported in 
Bertacchini et al. (2018), who find that private museums in Italy offer more services than 
governmental museums; this coincidence is not surprising, since the databanks are similar 
(consider, however that Bertacchini et al. resorted to the 2011 census data; thus, our up-dated 
investigation tells that four more years have not entailed significant changes in this respect). 
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Table 5 - Number of total services offered: SAR models 
  (1)_ (2)_ (3)_ (4)_ (5)_ (6)_ 
  SAR SAR SAR SAR SAR SAR 
SPATIAL LAGGED YREG 0.602 0.298 0.312 
    (0.057)*** (0.055)*** (0.056)*** 
SPATIAL LAGGED YPROV 
   
0.357 0.203 0.221 
 (0.042)*** (0.037)*** (0.039)*** 
AUTON 4.365 2.063 2.072 4.412 2.079 2.082 
 (0.401)*** (0.333)*** (0.333)*** (0.402)*** (0.334)*** (0.334)*** 
OUTS 0.776 1.575 1.512 0.912 1.618 1.541 
 (0.331)** (0.269)*** (0.271)*** (0.329)*** (0.267)*** (0.269)*** 
PRIV 0.015 0.808 0.806 0.048 0.827 0.826 
 (0.306)_ (0.228)*** (0.228)*** (0.306)_ (0.227)*** (0.228)*** 
MUS 
 
2.911 2.925 
 
2.956 2.975 
 (0.290)*** (0.290)*** (0.290)*** (0.291)*** 
NET 
 
1.010 0.974 
 
1.042 1.009 
 (0.207)*** (0.208)*** (0.208)*** (0.208)*** 
BEF 1946 
 
-0.018 -0.039 
 
0.010 0.034 
 (0.312)_ (0.313)_ (0.313)_ (0.312)_ 
EDU 
 
3.593 3.605 
 
3.627 3.628 
 (0.227)*** (0.227)*** (0.228)*** (0.228)*** 
DIR 
 
1.425 1.469 
 
1.472 1.504 
 (0.232)*** (0.235)*** (0.233)*** (0.235)*** 
CUR 
 
1.619 1.617 
 
1.598 1.591 
 (0.221)*** (0.222)*** (0.222)*** (0.222)*** 
FRIENDS 
 
-0.057 -0.036 
 
-0.025 -0.031 
 
(0.221)_ (0.221)_ (0.221)_ (0.222)_ 
INTERINST 
 
1.479 1.488 
 
1.530 1.528 
 (0.209)*** (0.209)*** (0.210)*** (0.210)*** 
SURF 
 
0.970 0.979 
 
0.973 0.968 
 (0.082)*** (0.083)*** (0.082)*** (0.083)*** 
EMP 
 
0.041 0.041 
 
0.039 0.040 
 (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** 
EMP RATIO 
 
-0.013 -0.013 
 
-0.012 -0.012 
 (0.023)_ (0.023)_ (0.023)_ (0.023)_ 
MUS IN PROV 
  
0.008 
  
0.012 
   
(0.003)** 
  
(0.007)* 
BEDS 
  
-0.099 
  
-0.096 
 (0.129)_ (0.128)_ 
POP 
  
-0.211 
  
-0.267 
   
(0.169)_ 
  
(0.166)_ 
CONSTANT 5.022 -4.302 -0.208 8.504 -3.023 2.015 
  (0.809)*** (0.934)*** (2.236)_ (0.609)*** (0.775)*** (2.202)_ 
Observations 2165 2165 2165 2165 2165 2165 
Log pseudolikelihood -6952.74 -6337.34 -6334.23 -6960.09 -6336.31 -6332.81 
AIC 13917.47 12708.68 12708.47 13932.19 12706.60 12705.61 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Looking at the other regressors, galleries and museums (MUS) provide more services 
than monuments and archeological areas or parks. Regardless of the type of cultural 
institutions, those which are part of a network (NET) also show a higher number of services. 
Similarly, the presence of a director (DIR) and a scientific curator (CUR) is associated with a 
higher number of provided services. Clearly, this could also be partially due to the fact that 
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both professional profiles are more likely to be present in bigger museums.4 In this respect, 
we find evidence that, not surprisingly, museums with a larger exhibition surface (SURF) and 
more employees (EMP) provide a larger number of services. Instead, we do not find 
significant evidence for the number of employees per unit of surface (EMPRATIO); this piece 
of evidence –apart from considerations concerning the efficient use of inputs and their 
productivity– simply leads to the observation that the personnel is not used to improve the 
number of supplied services. 
Finally, the explanatory power of the environmental factors at the province level is 
rather weak. This is also clearly indicated by model information criteria (i.e., Log-pseudo-
likelihood and the Akaike Information Criterion) which suggest that no much improvement in 
the model explanatory power is gained once these controls are inserted in the equation 
specification. Only the number of museums in the same province (NMUSPROV) turns out to 
be positive and significant (at least at the 10% level), while the number of beds in the 
accommodation sector (BEDS) as well as the population (POP) in the province always 
display not-significant effects. This seems to suggest that the museums’ behavior in terms of 
services provided is not strongly influenced by the competitive pressure deriving from tourist 
inflow or resident population. 
This latter result is also relevant for the interpretation of the spatial dependence we find 
in the estimates. Specifically, it may suggest that the spatial dependence in the number of 
services provided by museums could not be due to strategic interdependence induced by 
competition to attract more visitors, but it could be due to other reasons, that is, reputational 
concerns and/or common institutional factors. 
As said above, though the pretty high number of total services under consideration (i.e., 
37), and its mean value (around 14), could support the SAR model as an appropriate modeling 
choice, it is advisable to check for the result correctness, by resorting to alternative regression 
models, in front of the fact that the regressand variable is a count variable. 
Table 6 reports the results from the auto-Poisson model, with the same six 
specifications as in Table 5. We still find a positive and significant spatial dependence in the 
number of services provided by museums; again, spatial dependence is always higher if using 
spatial weights matrix at the regional level. However, the spatial dependence which comes out 
                                                                        
4 Both the presence of a curator (DIR) and a scientific curator (CUR) are, in fact, positively and 
significantly correlated with both the exhibition surface (SURF) and the number of employees (EMP) in the 
museum, which should (at least partially) proxy for the museum dimension. 
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from the auto-Poisson model is slightly higher as compared to the outcome from the SAR 
model.  
 
Table 6 - Number of total services offered: SAR models – Auto-Poisson models 
  (1)_ (2)_ (3)_ (4)_ (5)_ (6)_ 
  POISSON POISSON POISSON POISSON POISSON POISSON 
SPATIAL LAGGED YREG 0.062 [0.892] 0.032 [0.462] 0.032 [0.466] 
    (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
SPATIAL LAGGED YPROV 
   
0.041 [0.583] 0.022 [0.310] 0.023 [0.331] 
 (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
AUTON 0.266 0.118 0.119 0.269 0.121 0.121 
 (0.023)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** (0.023)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** 
OUTS 0.042 0.107 0.105 0.053 0.110 0.106 
 (0.021)** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.022)** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** 
PRIV -0.002 0.056 0.057 0.001 0.058 0.059 
 (0.022)_ (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.022)_ (0.017)*** (0.017)*** 
MUS 
 
0.200 0.201 
 
0.202 0.204 
 (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.023)*** 
NET 
 
0.070 0.068 
 
0.075 0.072 
 (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** 
BEF 1946 
 
-0.006 -0.007 
 
-0.008 -0.007 
 (0.021)_ (0.022)_ (0.022)_ (0.022)_ 
EDU 
 
0.277 0.278 
 
0.279 0.280 
 (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)*** 
DIR 
 
0.117 0.119 
 
0.115 0.119 
 (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** 
CUR 
 
0.112 0.112 
 
0.111 0.112 
 (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** 
FRIENDS 
 
-0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.003 -0.001 
 
(0.015)_ (0.015)_ (0.015)_ (0.015)_ 
INTERINST 
 
0.104 0.105 
 
0.107 0.107 
 (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** 
SURF 
 
0.070 0.070 
 
0.069 0.070 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** 
EMP 
 
0.002 0.002 
 
0.002 0.002 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
EMP RATIO 
 
0.001 0.001 
 
0.001 0.001 
 (0.002)_ (0.002)_ (0.002)_ (0.002)_ 
MUS IN PROV 
  
0.001 
  
0.001 
   
(0.000)* 
  
(0.000)* 
BEDS 
  
-0.008 
  
-0.006 
 (0.009)_ (0.009)_ 
POP 
  
-0.012 
  
-0.012 
   
(0.011)_ 
  
(0.012)_ 
CONSTANT 1.723 1.104 1.314 2.029 1.254 1.565 
  (0.094)*** (0.087)*** (0.168)*** (0.063)*** (0.066)*** (0.153)*** 
Observations 2165 2165 2165 2165 2165 2165 
Log pseudolikelihood -7580.55 -6397.04 -6341.12 -7588.06 -6396.79 -6393.20 
AIC 15171.10 12826.10 12722.24 15186.13 12825.58 12824.41 
Note: Robust standard errors in round brackets, marginal effects (at means) in square brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 
5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
Looking at the marginal effects, estimates in Tables 5 or 6 suggest that a marginal 
increase in the average number of services in a region is, ceteris paribus, associated with an 
increase of about 0.3-0.9 in the expected number of services. As far as the other coefficients 
concern, the results from the auto-Poisson model are fully in line with those from the SAR 
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model. In particular, estimates of the environmental factors at the province level still confirm 
that their role in explaining museums’ behavior in the number of services provided is limited. 
Finally, Table 7 reports the results from the auto-binomial model which –as discussed in 
Section 3– overcomes the limitation of the auto-Poisson model. 
 
Table 7 - Number of total services offered: SAR models – Auto-binomial models 
  (1)_ (2)_ (3)_ (4)_ (5)_ (6)_ 
  BINOMIAL BINOMIAL BINOMIAL BINOMIAL BINOMIAL BINOMIAL 
SPATIAL LAGGED YREG 0.096 [0.022] 0.048 [0.011] 0.049 [0.011] 
    (0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
SPATIAL LAGGED YPROV 
   
0.066 [0.016] 0.034 [0.008] 0.038 [0.008] 
 (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** 
AUTON 0.478 0.229 0.231 0.484 0.233 0.233 
 (0.044)*** (0.037)*** (0.038)*** (0.044)*** (0.038)*** (0.038)*** 
OUTS 0.076 0.187 0.180 0.093 0.192 0.182 
 (0.037)** (0.032)*** (0.032)*** (0.037)** (0.032)*** (0.032)*** 
PRIV -0.002 0.094 0.094 0.003 0.098 0.098 
 (0.035)_ (0.028)*** (0.028)*** (0.036)_ (0.028)*** (0.028)*** 
MUS 
 
0.343 0.345 
 
0.345 0.348 
 (0.037)*** (0.037)*** (0.037)*** (0.037)*** 
NET 
 
0.119 0.115 
 
0.126 0.121 
 (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** 
BEF 1946 
 
-0.011 -0.012 
 
-0.012 -0.011 
 (0.040)_ (0.040)_ (0.040)_ (0.040)_ 
EDU 
 
0.425 0.427 
 
0.428 0.429 
 (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** 
DIR 
 
0.181 0.186 
 
0.178 0.187 
 (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** 
CUR 
 
0.191 0.191 
 
0.190 0.191 
 (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)*** (0.026)*** 
FRIENDS 
 
-0.011 -0.008 
 
-0.012 -0.009 
 
(0.027)_ (0.027)_ (0.027)_ (0.027)_ 
INTERINST 
 
0.179 0.179 
 
0.183 0.182 
 (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** 
SURF 
 
0.114 0.115 
 
0.114 0.115 
 (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** 
EMP 
 
0.005 0.005 
 
0.005 0.005 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
EMP RATIO 
 
-0.002 -0.002 
 
-0.002 -0.001 
 (0.003)_ (0.003)_ (0.003)_ (0.003)_ 
NMUS PROV 
  
0.001 
  
0.001 
   
(0.000)* 
  
(0.000)** 
BEDS 
  
-0.013 
  
-0.010 
 (0.015)_ (0.015)_ 
POP 
  
-0.031 
  
-0.029 
   
(0.021)_ 
  
(0.021)_ 
CONSTANT -1.920 -2.915 -2.449 -1.489 -2.718 -2.072 
  (0.141)*** (0.138)*** (0.282)*** (0.101)*** (0.108)*** (0.267)*** 
Observations 2165 2165 2165 2165 2165 2165 
Log pseudolikelihood -994.68 -941.57 -941.42 -994.81 -941.47 -941.23 
AIC 1999.37 1915.15 1920.83 1999.62 1914.95 1920.46 
Robust standard errors in round brackets, marginal effects (at means) in square brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
Again, we find a positive and significant spatial dependence in the number of museum 
services. Also the magnitude is equal to that from the auto-Poisson model. Specifically, the 
marginal effect of the spatial autoregressive coefficient in Table 7 implies that a marginal 
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increase in the average number of services in a region is, ceteris paribus, associated with an 
increase of about 0.008-0.022 in the proportion of services over the total of 37, corresponding 
to an increase of about 0.3-0.8 in the number of services. Overall, the results from the auto-
binomial model are fully in line with those from the auto-Poisson and the SAR models. 
 
4.2 Public and private museums 
 
In this section, we wonder whether the spatial dependence in museums’ behavior differs 
among public (that is, governmental) and private museums. This point is interesting per se, 
but, more importantly, it may provide further insights on the source of spatial dependence in 
museum services. In fact, if the spatial dependence is due to strategic interdependence 
induced by competition to attract more visitors, one would expect it is stronger (or, at least, 
not weaker) in private museums where competition should be fiercer and rules less strict than 
in the public sector; on the other hand, if the spatial dependence is due to reputational 
concerns and/or common institutional factors, one would expect it is stronger in public 
museums where reputational concerns should be more salient and institutional factors more 
stringent. 
Table 8 reports the results from our three models (i.e. SAR, auto-Poisson, auto-
binomial) on the subsamples of public (columns 1 to 3) and private (columns 4 to 6) 
museums, and each estimate refers to the full specification (i.e., with the inclusion of all the 
regressors under consideration).5 Notice also that, as the use of subsamples reduces the 
number of neighbors for each museum, the spatial weights matrix at the provincial level turns 
out to be overmuch sparse; hence, all estimation exercises in Table 8 use spatial weight matrix 
at the regional level. 
We find striking evidence of no spatial dependence in private museums, regardless of 
the model employed; on the contrary, estimates for public museums display positive and 
significant spatial dependence in all considered models. This is a core result in our present 
investigation: neighborhood effects hold for public, not for private, museum institutions. This 
outcome drives us to believe that the spatial dependence in museum service provision is due 
to reputational concerns and/or common institutional factors, rather than the pressure from 
competition. 
 
                                                                        
5 Table 8 reports the spatial coefficients only; the complete results of regressions are available upon 
request. 
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Table 8 - Offered services: public vs. private museums 
 Public Private 
  SAR POISSON BINOMIAL SAR POISSON BINOMIAL 
SPATIAL LAGGED YPUBLIC 0.345 0.033 [0.484] 0.055 [0.013] 
    (0.057)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)*** 
SPATIAL LAGGED YPRIVATE 
   
-0.019 0.008 [0.105] 0.001 [0.000] 
        (0.037)_ (0.009)_ (0.013)_ 
Museum type controls YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Museum other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Provincial controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1427 1427 1427 738 738 738 
Log pseudolikelihood -4170.33 -4190.09 -625.33 -2135.58 -2156.84 -313.73 
AIC 8378.67 8416.19 1286.67 4305.16 4345.69 659.47 
Robust standard errors in round brackets, marginal effects (at means) in square brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
 
4.3 Categories of services 
 
Finally, we investigate whether the spatial dependence differs among the three categories of 
museum services under consideration, namely, accessibility, supporting services, and web 
services. In principle, the underlying reasons which may induce spatial dependence, could be 
more or less relevant for the museums’ behavior in the three categories of services. For 
instance, accessibility services and supporting services are particularly important for 
competition in attracting visitors; web services are particularly important for the visibility of 
museums and for the valorization of the scientific content of the exhibitions, so they are 
relevant for the scientific competition among peers (museum directors) based on scientific 
research and reputation, publications and special exhibitions. However, common institutional 
factors might be more binding for the museums’ behavior related to the accessibility, and 
museum managers (in governmental museum without autonomy) cannot compete in this type 
of service. 
Table 9 reports the results obtained by using the number of services related to (a) the 
museum accessibility (N_SERV_ACCESS), (b) services supporting visitors’ experience 
(N_SUPPORT_SERV), and (c) web services (N_WEB_SERV), as the dependent variable, 
respectively.6 For each service category, we provide the estimates from the three models 
under current consideration (i.e., SAR, auto-Poisson, auto-binomial), for the two sub-samples 
of public and private museums, again using the spatial weight matrix at the regional level. 
Overall, the results for the three categories of services do not significantly differ from those 
obtained when considering the total number of services, in terms of both the presence 
(significance) and the magnitude of the spatial dependence effects. For governmental 
                                                                        
6 Full regressions are available upon request. 
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museums, all models provide spatial autocorrelation coefficients included in the interval 
(0.35, 0.55) in terms of marginal effect upon the number of offered services, for all the types 
of services under consideration.7 However, supporting services show a more limited spatial 
dependence, as compared to web and accessibility services.  
 
 
Table 9 - Provision of specific services - Public vs. private museums 
  Public Private 
  SAR POISSON BINOMIAL SAR POISSON BINOMIAL 
Accessibility; dependent variable: N_SERV_ACCESS 
SPATIAL LAGGED YPUBLIC 0.384 0.163 [0.521] 0.457 [0.101] 
    (0.082)*** (0.033)*** (0.090)*** 
SPATIAL LAGGED YPRIVATE 
   
0.061 0.077 [0.215] 0.080 [0.018] 
        (0.119)_ (0.062)_ (0.129)_ 
Museum type controls YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Museum other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Provincial controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1427 1427 1427 738 738 738 
Log pseudolikelihood -1999.82 -2367.69 -647.94 -1032.94 -1182.81 -345.42 
AIC 4037.66 4771.39 1331.87 2099.88 2397.63 722.85 
Supporting services; Dependent variable: N_SUPPORT_SERV  
SPATIAL LAGGED YPUBLIC 0.353 0.048 [0.459] 0.084 [0.019] 
    (0.071)*** (0.010)*** (0.016)*** 
SPATIAL LAGGED YPRIVATE 
   
-0.111 0.008 [0.067] 0.008 [0.002] 
        (0.094)_ (0.015)_ (0.023)_ 
Museum type controls YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Museum other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Provincial controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1427 1427 1427 738 738 738 
Log pseudolikelihood -3704.13 -3710.89 -635.09 -1892.54 -1899.01 -318.48 
AIC 7446.26 7457.79 1306.19 3819.08 3830.01 668.95 
Web services; Dependent variable: N_WEB_SERV 
SPATIAL LAGGED YPUBLIC 0.368 0.261 [0.552] 0.351 [0.058] 
    (0.072)*** (0.046)*** (0.063)*** 
SPATIAL LAGGED YPRIVATE 
   
-0.110 0.020 [0.046] 0.001 [0.000] 
        (0.105)_ (0.059)_ (0.083)_ 
Museum type controls YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Museum other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Provincial controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1427 1427 1427 738 738 738 
Log pseudolikelihood -2655.52 -2436.41 -528.19 -1341.34 -1258.71 -274.59 
AIC 5349.04 4908.81 1092.39 2716.68 2549.43 581.19 
Robust standard errors in round brackets, marginal effects (at means) in square brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
                                                                        
7 Remember that the marginal effect associated to the spatial parameter ρ of the auto-binomial specification 
captures the dependence of the proportion of counts (over the upper limit) upon the neighbors’ counts, and has to 
be interpreted accordingly; so the marginal effects equal to 0.101, 0.019 and 0.058 in the auto-binomial 
specifications are referred to the proportion of offered services, and they correspond to 0.505, 0.437, 0.522, 
respectively, if referred to the number of offered services. 
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5. Discussion and final remarks  
 
The main novelty of the present analysis rests in showing that spatial dependence –that is, a 
neighborhood effect– is relevant in museum services’ provision; however, the neighborhood 
effect is statistically significant for governmental museums and other similar cultural 
institutes, while it is not significant for private museums. The neighborhood effect, as 
captured by a statistically significant spatial autocorrelation coefficient, means that the 
number of services offered by a museum is influenced by the average number of services 
offered by the museums located in the same region or province. 
We are interested in discussing whether the spatial dependence can be interpreted as a 
result of competition among museums. The evidence that spatial dependence holds for public, 
but not for private, museums, casts some doubts on the fact that neighborhood effects are 
motivated by true competition. 
The institutional context in which public museums operate might suggest that spatial 
dependence is due to reputational concerns and/or common institutional factors, rather than 
sound competition. Some further elements could support this view. 
In Italy, a conservative approach to the cultural heritage and museums’ collections still 
prevails; several rules for governmental museums are set at the central level, and several 
management decisions are taken by regional administrative bodies. The process towards the 
administrative and accounting autonomy of museums and archaeological sites has started later 
than in other European countries and appears to have been a stop-and-go process where 
administrative reforms to grant autonomy have been followed by legislative acts substantially 
dismantling the previous ones. Today, as a matter of fact, only a limited number of 
(outstanding) museums and sites benefit from a large degree of autonomy, while ‘autonomy’ 
in several cases concerns a limited set of financial and managerial choices: the comprehensive 
reform in 2014 has provided large financial and managerial autonomy only to the thirty most 
famous museums and archaeological sites; all other museums and cultural sites are directly or 
indirectly (if there is a director) managed by “regional museum hubs” and do not benefit from 
any real financial autonomy (Zan et al. 2018, p. 539). The autonomy of museums does not 
involve in any case the human resource management and, in a large part, the terms of 
accessibility (i.e. working hours, opening hours, etc.). Incentives and financing schemes8 of 
cultural sites do not promote the valorization really: the entrance fees go back to the central 
government; only autonomous museums and archaeological sites can keep (totally or 
                                                                        
8 On the optimal financing schemes for museum, see Fernandez-Blanco & Prieto-Rodriguez (2006).  
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partially, according to the cases) their entrance fees for internal restoration and/or valorization 
programs. The financing schemes for museums and other cultural sites, designed by the 
public agency, are based on redistributive goals and the public agent totally or partially 
withdraws the revenues from the entrance fees to benefit and preserve the less known cultural 
heritage. This goal could be reasonable and well-founded; however, it is far from designing a 
scheme able to induce real competition among public museums; some incentive mechanisms 
can be introduced without losing this final meritorious goal. 
Moreover, at present, the largest part of public administrators involved in the 
conservation and valorization of cultural goods, as well as public museums’ and 
archaeological sites’ directors, have a strictly legal and humanities formation background, and 
lack managerial skills. They usually believe that competition on scientific reputation (on 
scientific activities and publications) is more important than competition in attracting visitors. 
Thus, the institutional framework drives managers to be more concerned with the 
conservation than the economic valorization of cultural heritage. 
However, the more and more stringent public budget constraints, and the need to fill the 
gap with the different concepts of museums that are spreading in the world, have encouraged 
public administrators and public museum directors to allow the entrance of private enterprises 
to supply supporting and web services. Since 1993, when the Ronchey Law came into force, 
private firms have applied for granting the supply of supporting, web and, sometimes, 
accessibility services in governmental museums. Bertacchini et al (2018) not surprisingly find 
that the availability of such complementary services is larger in governmental museums that 
resort to outsource for providing such services: governmental museums with financial 
autonomy and outsourced services outperform public museums directly or indirectly run by 
the different layers of government. 
However, private firms that provide such services have to serve a large number of 
museums and cultural institutions, in order to exploit economies of scale and to make the 
business of complementary service supply profitable. 
Thus, spatial dependence in the provision of complementary services by part of public 
museums can be generated by the fact that the same set of services is offered by the same 
private firms to a set of similar museums (possibly located in near areas, to limit the 
production cost of private firms supplying the services). A key question concerns the fact 
whether these private firms are involved in a truly competitive process, to obtain the grant for 
providing the services. In a recent investigation on museums, the Italian Court of Auditors 
(Corte dei Conti) observes that the same race and the same financial scheme for providing 
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public museum with outsourced complementary services has been extended for more than the 
four years initially established by the law, and, since 2009, the grants have been always 
attributed to the same private providers (Corte dei Conti, 2017); in other words, several 
doubts exist about the competitive nature of the market for museum service provision. New 
races should be implemented by the public sector to guarantee competition in the supply of 
complementary services for governmental museums, and the outsourcing schemes should be 
re-negotiated as far as the responsibility for the quality control and the sharing of the revenues 
concern. 
These observations can support the view that the spatial dependence characterizing 
service provision in governmental museums could depend on the design of the race rules 
governing the grants for the outsourced provision of services to governmental museums, 
rather than sound competition among museums. 
Borrowing the terminology proposed by Manski (2000), our discussion leads to argue 
that neighborhood effects can due to three types of interaction. (i) Peer effect and the search 
of scientific and social recognition drive museum directors to offer similar services as their 
neighbors. This is what Mansky labels as ‘endogenous interaction’: the propensity of an agent 
to behave in a given way varies with the behavior of the group to which he/she belongs. (ii) 
The similarity of personal characteristics of a large part of museum managers drives them to 
offer similar services: this is a form of ‘contextual interaction’, where individual behavior is 
determined by the exogenous features of the reference group. (iii) Common rules –at the 
national level, and especially at the regional level where public bodies make management 
choices for public museums with no autonomy– lead to ‘correlated effects’, which emerge in 
the case in which agents in the same group behave similarly simply because they share 
common institutional rules and incentives. Unfortunately, data limitation prevents us from 
disentangling the different sources of neighborhood effects; hopefully, future research could 
provide further insights on this issue, probably exploiting the time dimension of the 
longitudinal data concerning museums’ behavior. Nevertheless, let us underline that several 
motives supporting the neighborhood effects have little to do with sound competition among 
museums. 
Of course, we do not disregard that competition could be important to improve the 
quality of offered services, also in the museum sector. Nor we have argued that competitive 
motivations are absent in the museum sector. Simply, we have documented that in Italy 
spatial correlation exists, in the museum complementary services’ provision, like in other 
public service sectors. However, this spatial dependence is not only interpretable as a sign of 
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sound competition, entailing quality improvements. Perhaps, further legal and administrative 
reforms concerning governmental museums are necessary, along with a truly deep change in 
the feeling about the museum mission, to implement truly competitive processes among and 
within public and private museums. 
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